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INTRODUCTION TO LEONARDO POLO´S PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVATION 
John Branya 
        The purpose of this article is to give a brief bird’s eye view of L. Polo highlighting the 
motivation and originality of his philosophy. We do not intend to assess how original he was and 
whether his claims are accurate or not. That will require a longer and deeper study which goes 
beyond the limits of this article.  
        There are many good articles explaining the origin and development of Leonardo Polo’s 
philosophy: "(Selles Dauder, n.d.)", "(Corazón González, 2011)"}, "(Cruz-Cruz, 1992)", "(Yepes 
Stork, 2005)", "(Falgueras Salinas, n.d.)", "(Falgueras Salinas, García González, Padial, & 
Universidad de Málaga, 2003)"}, "(Piá Tarazona, n.d.)" to quote but a few. This article does not 
add much to the previous ones. It is mainly intended for a non-Spanish audience, who probably 
know little about L. Polo’s philosophy. It’s main value is that it based on Leonardo Polo’s 
explanation of his own thought. In the prologue to the first volume of ‘Antropología 
Transcendental’ Polo looks over his shoulder after his retirement. He considers the two volumes 
of ‘Antropología Transcendental to be the apex and last stone of his philosophical undertaking. 
We include translation done by Derrick Esclanda of this prologue at the end of the article. The 
translation of the texts in the body of the article are mine. 
        The article has two distinctive parts, the first one gives his historical background, the 
second is a quick analysis of his own autobiography as he gives it in the prologue to the first 









        In order to understand L. Polo better it is fitting to present a short sketch of his life and 
the thematic development of his thought. I found it pedagogical to classify his life in six stages; 
childhood, university studies and discovery, first works, years of silence, mature works and 
retirement. Polo himself values personal history to understand a philosopher as he states in 
‘Lecciones de Ética’: 
        “Memory is very important for man, because man depends of his past and his present way 
of understanding todays reality is impossible if one does not take into account the past. What 
has happened to me has improved or deprived me.” (Polo, 2013) 
  
Childhood (1926 to 1945) 
  
        In this stage the intellectual development was forged first in Madrid where he studied in, 
the Lycée Française, in Madrid which initiated him into foreign languages when he was still a 
child. He had to move with his family in 1937 to in Albacete due to the strenuous war 
circumstances in Madrid. After the war in 1939 the family moved back to Madrid where he 
studied in the Instituto Cardinal Cisneros. He had to repeat one year, so he had plenty of time 
to read on his own. He finished with an award for Extraordinary Performance. When he was 14 
he was initiated to philosophy by reading the book of a clear and deep philosopher of the 
previous century, Jaime Balmes. From them on he continue reading avidly the philosophy books 
that were available both in the well-stocked library of his grandfather and from the equally well 






        From the vital point of view, the Civil War surely left profound marks in his life, seeing his 
family in danger –his maternal uncle who was a member of parliament for Melilla was killed, and 
his father who also held public positions during the republic had to seek refuge in South America 
and died abroad. 
  
University and Discovery (1945 to 1962) 
  
        This second stage corresponds to his university studies. He did his undergraduate in Law 
which he studied to follow his family tradition. His father and two uncles were very good lawyers 
and his surviving uncle encouraged him to study law so that he could work in the family law 
firm. Leonardo was more inclined to study mathematics but he decided to follow his family 
tradition. Nevertheless, when he finished in 1949, and after working for a little while in the firm 
he realised that his heart was not for it, and decided to follow an academic life. He got a grant 
to do a PhD in Law.  
        While he was studying Law he continued delving on philosophical topics as he remembers 
from time to time in his books, as this quotation suggests: 
        “Here is an old idea I thought about when I was about 20 years old . It can be developed 
futher, though. How many times man gets the opposite of what he wanted because he finds a 
legality that is not technical. The means have to be related to norms. This is a legality that if it 
is not resepcted, the opposite happens. It is almost certain that man is incoherent when he does 
not respect the legality; the relationship between the means and the good. From evil one cannot 
get good, because the good is spoiled.” 
        While he did law he continued reading avidly philosophy and in 1950 he had an answer to 
his many questions. It was his Aha! moment. It was like a sudden intuition that opened the door 
that made it possible to join the achievements of the modern and classic philosophies thanks to 






        “… it suddenly occurred to me, period. I was pondering about thinking and being, and 
about what being had to do with thinking; then I realized that we cannot arrive at being if one 
does not abandon the supposition of the object, because the supposition makes the object 
limited and a limited knowledge cannot be a knowledge of being if this is taken in the 
transcendental sense.” (Cruz-Cruz, 1992). 
        He called his discovery the discovery and abandonment of the mental limit. 
        “Many years ago I made the proposal to find a method to overcome the limits of the mental 
presence in man. This proposal brings the fact that human beings have knowledge powers 
superior to those “present-showing” and these are the habits. Certainly this proposal is not easily 
aceptable to thomistic philosophers. Nevertheless, among the many reasons to support it are 
the following. Firstly that habits cannot be limited to be a mere static repository of knowledge. 
Secondly that from long time ago –remember Plato- the knowledge of truth is something like a 
transcendental memory. But this transcendentality is not proper of the human mental presence, 
that in no way intrinsically penetrates into the remembrance of truth”.  (Polo, Epistemologia, 
Creacion, Elevacion, unpublished). 
        This method will give access to the new transcendental fields of Anthropology maintaining 
the classic metaphysic but above it. 
        “In order to open the new area of what is transcendental is necessary to use the method 
that I call the abandonment of the mental limit. This is a proper name because the mental 
operations are the inferior acts of knowledge and therefore what is known through these 
operations has naturally to be limited. This limitation can be discovered from the intellectual 
habits that are superior powers of knowledge than the operations. Nevertheless the knowing 
operation is commeasured with what it knows –what is called the object-. If one takes the 
limitation of the object, when one abandon the limit imposed by the operation, one reaches the 
trans-objective themes. If one takes the limitation of the operation, when one abandon the limit 
imposed by the operation, one reaches the trans-operational themes. The first corresponds to 






        This intuition needed much work and this is why probably he concurrently to his phd 
studies he started and undergraduate degree in Philosophy. The phd grant allowed him to go to 
Rome, where he lived with St. Josemaria, a great source of inspiration for his life and his 
philosophy. There he read and wrote extensively, some 10 to 12 hours a day. During his stay in 
Rome he wrote the manuscript ‘The Real Distinction’ that contained his main discoveries and 
parts of which will eventually be the source of most of his works. He never finished his doctorate 
in Law. Once the grant was over, he started working at the recently started University of 
Navarre. The first year he taught in the Faculty of Law, and the following year 1955 in the 
Faculty of Philosophy which was just started. He finished his degree in Philosophy in 1959 and 
obtain a doctorate in Philosophy under the professor Millan Puelles in 1961. His doctoral 
dissertation, which won a prize, became his first published work “Evidencia y Realidad in 
Descartes” in 1963. 
        His reading during this period, and probably afterwards was so intense that he used to 
comment that he did not need the University to allocate funds for buying books for him, as the 
following anecdote corroborates: 
        It was commented that when he was helping Prof. Alvaro D’Ors in the organization of the 
Humanities Library, whenever faced with some problem he will joyfully say: “why do we need 
so many books if I have already read them all?” (Castilla de Cortazar, n.d.) 
  
First published works (1963-1968) 
  
        This period corresponds with his first three published works and the appointment of the 
professorship to the new established seat of philosophy in the University of Granada in 1966, 
where he taught until 1968. He went back to the University of Navarre, this time as a professor.  
        The first published of his works ‘Evidencia y Realidad in Descartes’ is based on his doctoral 






is actually hidden voluntarism.  The second of his works ‘El accesso al ser’ was to be the first of 
a series of five explaining his method and main achievements. It develops the intuition of the 
method that opens the way to reach reality, the existent, the being. The new method, which he 
calls the ‘abandonment of the mental limit’ reaches the existence and essence of the world 
(‘extra-mental reality’ as he calls it, and then the existence and essence of the person. Each of 
these 4 topics will have been a new book. During this period he only managed to published the 
first one ‘El Ser-I, la Existencia Extramental’.  The poor reception of the books and probably 
mental fatigue made him stop publishing for about 14 years.   
  
Silent years (1968-1982) 
  
        During these years he continued lecturing in the University of Navarre. During the summer 
months he started traveling to some universities in South America where some of his past 
students, would invite him to assist in the training of faculty members. He would not be idle; he 
kept on working on his manuscripts in order to present his method in a better way.  He was 
preparing the foundations of what would later become the five volumes of ‘Curso de Teoría del 
Conocimiento´ (Theory of Knowledge Course) –one of his master works- and later the two 
volumes of “Antropología Transcendental” which he considers the culmination of his work. 
  
Mature works (1982-1996) 
  
        In 1982 one of his students, a nurse by profession, requested her classmates to record 
Polo’s classes which she could not attend because of her work shifts. The students realised that 
the transcription of the lectures could be easily published once the professor had corrected 






again. It was this students’ initiative that led to the publication of the five volumes of Theory of 
Knowledge and later the culmination of his work, and the two volumes of Transcendental 
Anthropology.  The motivation and opinion L. Polo had on these books can be seen in the 
paragraphs 23 to 25 of the translated prologue in the Annex. 
  
Retirement (1996 – 2013) 
  
        In Spain it is mandatory that professors retire at 70. D. Leonardo had to do so, but he 
continued having an office in the Faculty, where he went from time to time. Most of his time 
was spent at his home in the city where he continued receiving colleagues, disciples and friends. 
With the help of some of his past students he corrected the manuscripts of the books transcribed 
from his lectures and conferences. Following a suggestion of one of his disciples he prepared a 
new book in which he applies his philosophical findings to the theology of Christ, perfect man 
and perfect God. This book is in still unpublished to date. 
  
Analysis of the Prologue to Transcendental Anthropology 
  
        There is no better account to the life of a philosopher than his own memories. Leonardo 
Polo does it in the Introduction to the first volume of his “Antropología Transcendental”.  
        We analyze it and give the complete translation as an annex in order to keep the integrity 
of his text for easy reading.  
  







        The prologue has 27 paragraphs and its structure is as follows:  
  
a) Purpose of the book # 1-2 
b) The risks undertaken # 3-7 
c) Core of his philosophy #8-9 
d) His philosophy as continuation of the perpetual philosophy #10-14 
e) Value of modern philosophy #15-20 
f) The culmination and explanation of his main works #20-24 
g) Style considerations regarding the book #25-26 
h) Thanking his collaborators #27 
  
Position of ‘Antropología Transcendental’ in his philosophical enterprise. 
  
        When L. Polo mentions that from the beginning of his career he was trying to see the 
proper relationship between metaphysics and anthropology he is probably recounting his first 
philosophical readings that started when he was 14 by reading the Fundamental Philosophy 
volumes of Jaime Balmes. 
        The fruit of his search was to discover the impossibility of dealing with the human being 






transcendental classic method of distinguishing categories and transcendentals but at a new 
level the personal level. This is why he named his way of doing anthropology, transcendental 
anthropology, and the new transcendentals ´personal transcendentals´. In the same way that 
the metaphysical transcendentals, transcend the categories and therefore are found in all 
beings, the anthropological or personal transcendentals apply to all persons, as persons, not 
just as mere beings. The–personal-being- is different from the being of the non-persons, he 
indicates it is co-being or co-existence. This is the main topic of this first volume of his 
Antropología Transcendental. 
  
Looking over his shoulder regarding purpose and reception 
  
        After two brief paragraphs Polo then switches to the difficulties he faced to reach this point 
of finishing his philosophical enterprise, which, as anything worthy, required vast efforts and 
some natural missunderstanding. He politely calls the obstacles he faced ‘risks’. The fourth risks 
Leonardo Polo highlights in his preface correspond somehow to the stages of his life discussed 
above.  
        The first one was strength. Such a grandiose work he envisaged in his years of Rome, 
required a revision of most of the modern and contemporary philosophy. He tried very hard 
while in Rome, but his body resented it and he had a serious bout of mental fatigue that took a 
long time to overcome, and that from time to time would recur.  
        Within the first risk he includes the risk of not being understood, which actually happened. 
If it is true that he has a number of followers who understand and value his contribution, they 
are few and mainly those he personally taught. It is clear that mental fatigue and being 
misunderstood are different type of risks, but probably the emotional weight of being rejected 
and isolated contributes to the lack of strength to continue struggling in a daunting task. This 







        The second risk has ethical connotations. If he was wrong, he would mislead people. 
Freedom is the key to understand transcendental anthropology and of its proper understanding 
depends the goodness of people of society and the good work in philosophy and theology. In 
passing he comments that he does not follow the Hegelian way of doing philosophy, which 
probably was one of the things that lead to some misunderstandings.  
        The third risk brings to light what was already suggested in the previous one, and he does 
not elaborate on it further. 
        And finally the fourth which has also some ethical connotation, he is trying to refute the 
claim that his philosophy is just a personal attempt to be singular, original, which may smack of 
vanity. On the intentions one cannot judge, so one has to trust the author and see his work. 
There is no doubt that Leonardo Polo is original, but as he said, most of his thoughts can be 
traced to philosophers he has read and assimilated. His new achievements put together with 
the new light of his method, what was already insinuated in many other authors, and he refers 
continuously to them in his works and acknowledges their achievements. He also clearly points 
out where he thinks they fall short and, from his new vantage point, suggest where they have 
to rectify. This seems to bear the mark of a great philosopher. What may give rise to the 
misunderstanding of thinking that Polo wants to be original is the use of new expressions, and 
the new meaning he gives to traditional philosophical and common terms. In this they have a 
point, because it is not easy to find which use he gives to each word and one has to be very 
careful on the context. One cannot read Polo in a hurry, or just once. Furthermore he takes 
gives many things for granted when he writes, expecting the reader to be as conversant with 
the classic philosophers as he was, or to have read as much as he did. The remembrance of one 
of his students can give weight to these statements. 
        “In 1975, while still an undergraduate and perhaps with some youth vehemence I went to 
D. Leonardo and told him that I had decided to make my doctoral dissertation on aspect of his 
thought. D. Leonardo looked at me over his glasses and warned me not to think of doing such 
a thing. I probably showed some kind of shock, because he found it necessary to explain that 







first my disappointment lead me to rebellion, I accepted to try to befriend Aristotle, who even 
today I still have as a master. 
        This personal anecdote serves to show something substantial in the work of D. Leonardo: 
to know more of the classics, to deepen on them, is really to go deep within yourself, because 
they are the source of philosophizing, a perennially renewed origin, with latencies, but without 
opacities.” (Yepes Stork, 2005). 
  
Continuity with classical philosophy 
  
        After having a recount of the difficulties he makes a clear statement of the fundamental 
key to understand his philosophy, which stems from the highest point of classical philosophy. 
        Specifically, my approach stems from the real distinction between being and essence 
formulated by Thomas Aquinas, which is the last important finding of traditional 
philosophy.(Polo, 1999) 
        He sees his philosophy in continuity with classical philosophy and especially with Thomas 
Aquinas, which was present in his thought since he read Jaime Balmes at 14.   
        “Together with other thinkers of the XX centuries he worried about the formalism of the 
late Scholastic Philosophy. He managed to get to the root of the problem with the method of 
‘reaching the being’, while other ten years later some neo-Thomistic philosophers in the 60s 
discover that the key to Thomas Aquinas thought is the distinction between essence and being. 
How many times he repeated that ‘a thought cow does not give milk’, or that the ‘I thought does 
not think’! Proving that the idealism does not work and showing the importance of abandoning 








        His continuity with classic philosophy is clearly indicated by one of his best disciples the 
late R. Yepes York in a short article he wrote for the general public after the Congress organized 
in Pamplona in honour of Leonardo Polo’s on his retirement in 1996. 
        “From here we can see that Polo knows the great philosophers well. Some like Parmenides, 
Eckhard o Descartes passionately occupy some period of his life. Others like Heidegger have 
inspired him. But he has thought deeply on three. 
        Firstly on Aristotle, with whom he has special affinity and who marks the lines of Polo’s 
theory of knowledge and ethics. 
        Secondly, Thomas Aquinas, from which he takes a great portion of his corpus and specially 
the distinction between being and essence which he takes to its limit. 
        And in third place Hegel, who is the apex of modernity. On him the modern ideal reaches 
its peak. ‘Hegel formulates his speculative ambition raising reason to its maximum height. But 
we have to note that mental presence of man is a limit. If one manages to abandon the limit, 
the Hegelian attempt is over and one has a new departure point. This is my proposal”.  (Yepes, 
Aceprensa 1996 ?) 
  
The problems of classical Thomism 
  
        Nevertheless he thinks that in order to progress the classical Thomism, including Thomas 
himself has to be redirected because it cannot progress unless it recognizes the mental limit and 
becomes transcendental in anthropology. 
        “The weakening of the historical Thomism is due to the fact that their understanding of 







limit has not yet been detected and that, therefore, it slowed down the impulse toward 
transcendental anthropology. 
        Thomistic philosophy still focuses on the study of man as nature and substance. Although 
Aquinas overcomes the Greek understanding in metaphysics, he does not apply it to the human 
being.”  (Polo, 1999). 
        The solution is to overcome the limitations of the Greek metaphysics and go beyond them 
by abandoning the mental limit which will also achieve a new way of composition higher than 
the Aristotelian hylemorphic. 
        Thomism is a synthesis of Christian philosophy in which the mental limit has not yet been 
detected and that, therefore, it slowed down the impulse toward a transcendental anthropology. 
(Polo, 1999) 
  
The problems and value of modern philosophy 
  
        Nevertheless a continuation of the traditional philosophy cannot ignore the thought and 
developments of modern thinkers. They have something to contribute. There should be a 
positive dialogue so that what is not accurate can be discovered and what is missing in the 
classical philosophy can be incorporated. This is a necessary task for any philosopher. 
        “the proposed continuation of Thomism -which ignores the transcendental aspect of 
freedom- , cannot progress without a critique of modern philosophy.” 
        The contribution of modern philosophy, as Polo sees it, is to show clearly the limit, the 
impossibility of continuing doing philosophy in the classical way. The new method will show the 
limits of both ways of doing philosophy and open the door to continue doing classical 







        Idealism brings out in a clear way the mental limit, whose detection is essential for the 
continuation of traditional philosophy. Again, the mental spotting of the  limit is not independent 
of overcoming idealism.  (Polo, 1999). 
  
The culmination and explanation of his main works 
  
        In the following paragraphs L. Polo states the work he had given himself after he had the 
intuition of the new method, and how it changed over the years. He does it considering mainly 
the thematic approach, but we should take into account some of the points mentioned when 
considering the stages of the vital development, which no doubt, also influenced his works. 
        “I cite the book on which this method is exposed and the thematic plan for its development 
and the changes that the original plan suffered.”  (Polo, 1999). 
        Rather than repeating his words, we include a simple sketch that summarizes the text. 
El acceso al ser (1964): 
- El ser I (Extra-mental Existence) (1965) 
- El ser II (Extra-mental Essence) 
   - Teoría del conocimiento, v. IV first part (1994) 
   - Teoría del conocimiento, v. IV second part (1996) 
- El ser III (Human Person) drafted 1970, Anthropologia Trascendental I (1999) 










        L. Polo was not a good writer. His mind was too fast, too elevated for writing or typing. 
He was a good speaker, thinking as he was speaking. His first books “El acceso al ser” y ‘El-ser-
I’ are paradigmatic. The books and articles based on his lectures and conferences are easier to 
read. Aware of this in this late book he makes two interesting remarks; one that the book has 
many sources ‘plurality’. Some of his books are collections of notes from different times and 
lectures that he later put together, rather than going into the pain of writing again. It seems 
that his fear to the pen also motivated the second point he makes, that of citing himself 
frequently. In spite of these remarks the books flows well and what is more important, gives 
light to his previous works. This makes it advisable for those who want to read his main works 
to read then backwards, starting from the two volumes of ‘Antropología Transcendental’ followed 
by the five volumes of ‘´Curso de Teoría del Conocimiento’ to finally try ‘El Ser-I’ y ‘El Acceso al 
Ser’. 
        “I must admit that together with formal defects due in large part to the plurality of its 
immediate sources, there are many references to my own books.”  (Polo, 1999). 
  
Gratitude to his collaborators 
  
        He finalizes acknowledging the work of his immediate collaborators and in a special way 
the Dean of the Faculty, who constantly encouraged him, even after his retirement, to finish 
writing his originally planned series of works. No wonder Professor Angel González is now in 
charge of Leonardo Polo´s intellectual legacy. 
        We hope that this brief introduction would generate some interest in reading and translating 
the works of this humble, innovative and generous philosopher and help to make his 
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OF LEONARDO POLO BARRENA 
Translated by Derrick Esclanda 
  
1.    This book is certainly the culmination of 
my philosophical inquiry. What I mean by 
this is that the method that has led up to 
it can no longer give more of itself. But, 
since this method makes access to 
abundant thematic fruits possible, this 
book is added to the harvest that is 
contained, but not exhausted in other 
writings. Because of its double value - 
methodological and thematic - the 
summit reopens the various thematic 
areas: it re-iterates them. 
2.    The task of the pages that follow is the 
development of the transcendental 
character of anthropology. As I see it, 
anthropology is not a regional ontology 
nor a chapter of metaphysics, because it 
deals with personal being, which cannot 
be reduced to the sense of being that 
metaphysics studies. One of the central 
chapters of first philosophy, especially in 
the Middle Ages, is the theory of the 
transcendentals; there are also 
transcendentals that correspond to 
1.    Seguramente este libro es el vértice de 
mi investigación filosófica. Quiero decir 
con esto que el método que la ha 
conducido no da más de sí. Pero como 
ese método permite acceder a frutos 
temáticos abundantes, este libro se 
añade a la cosecha contenida y no 
agotada en otros escritos. Por su doble 
valor –metódico y temático– la cima 
vuelve a abrir los diversos campos 
temáticos: los re-itera. 
2.    El cometido de las páginas que siguen 
es el desarrollo del carácter 
trascendental de la antropología. A mi 
modo de ver, la antropología no es una 
ontología regional ni un capítulo de la 
metafísica, porque trata del ser 
personal, el cual no se reduce al sentido 
del ser que estudia la metafísica. Uno 
de los capítulos centrales de la filosofía 
primera, sobre todo en la Edad Media, 
es la teoría de los trascendentales; al 
ser personal le corresponden también 







personal being, which need to be added 
to those discovered by traditional 
philosophy. For this reason, the nucleus 
of the contents of the present book is 
what I call the expansion of the 
transcendentals, that is, the presentation 
of the transcendentals that do not appear 
on the classical list. 
3.    My interest in philosophy began many 
years ago. From the start I kept in mind 
the relationship between metaphysics 
and anthropology. And throughout all 
this time I have tried to uncover its 
various aspects. Coming after other 
writings, a compendium of my version of 
these relations is presented here. Fitting 
together such abundant yet diverse 
material together has not been easy. 
Therefore, in this preface, it is 
appropriate to refer to the inherent risks 
of such a long a journey; nevertheless, I 
have always thought that facing them 
was worthwhile. 
4.    The first risk was that the research 
project would falter out of lack of 
strength, or, if it did move forward, that 
is would not be accepted by the 
community of philosophers. I was 
los descubiertos por la filosofía 
tradicional. Por eso, la parte nuclear del 
contenido del presente libro es lo que 
llamo ampliación de los 
trascendentales, es decir, la exposición 
de los trascendentales que no aparecen 
en el elenco clásico. 
3.    Empecé a ocuparme de la filosofía hace 
muchos años. Desde el inicio he tenido 
en cuenta las relaciones de la metafísica 
con la antropología. Y durante todo este 
tiempo he procurado desplegar sus 
diversos aspectos. Después de otros 
escritos, se expone aquí un compendio 
de mi versión de dichas relaciones. 
Encajar asuntos tan abundantes como 
dispares no ha sido fácil. Por eso, en 
este prólogo, es oportuno aludir a los 
riesgos inherentes a una andadura tan 
larga; sin embargo, siempre me ha 
parecido que valía la pena afrontarlos. 
4.    El primer riesgo era que el proyecto de 
investigación se detuviera por escasez 
de fuerzas, o bien, que si salía adelante, 
no fuese aceptado por la comunidad de 
filósofos. Me exponía de antemano a 
permanecer inédito o a publicar sin que 







especially in danger of remaining 
unpublished or to publish, but without 
anyone understanding me. Although, 
fortunately, some readers have 
understood the methodological and 
thematic dimensions that I have been 
proposing for over forty years, the circle 
of specialists that have paid attention to 
them has been few in number. As is 
clear, this circumstance is no cause for 
complaint. The situation of being a little 
known author is comfortable because it 
avoids the headaches that come after the 
publication of a doctrine whose 
elaboration has been too demanding. 
Moreover, entering into arguments with 
thinkers who already maintain 
established positions, or schools, rarely 
leads to a fruitful dialogue. 
5.    The second risk was that of falling into 
errors, that is, that my way of 
approaching philosophical questions 
might later oblige me to backtrack: not 
so much being a little read author, but to 
have to correct and retract my writings. 
Especially, upon understanding that 
freedom is a personal transcendental, 
this risk became much more serious, 
because the transcendental approach to 
fortuna, algunos lectores han 
comprendido las dimensiones 
metódicas y temáticas que vengo 
proponiendo desde hace más de 
cuarenta años, el círculo de 
especialistas que le han prestado 
atención es reducido. Como es claro, 
esta circunstancia no es motivo de 
queja. La situación de autor minoritario 
es cómoda porque evita quebraderos de 
cabeza posteriores a la publicación de 
una doctrina cuya elaboración los ha 
exigido en demasía. Por otra parte, 
entrar en discusión con pensadores que 
mantienen posturas ya consolidadas, o 
de escuela, raramente conduce a un 
diálogo fructífero. 
5.    El segundo riesgo era incurrir en 
equivocaciones, es decir, que mi modo 
de plantear las cuestiones filosóficas me 
obligara después a recoger velas: no ya 
ser un autor poco leído, sino tener que 
rectificar o retractarme de mis escritos. 
Justamente, al entender que la libertad 
es un trascendental personal, este 
riesgo se agudizaba mucho, porque es 
patente que el enfoque trascendental 
de la libertad aparece en varios 







freedom clearly appears in many modern 
thinkers; for example, in Kant and in 
Jaspers. Therefore, I was at risk of falling 
into errors or of being misinterpreted, 
because, in spite of the terminological 
similarity, my way of understanding 
freedom is different from that of modern 
speculations. Anecdotally, it can be 
mentioned that some persons have held 
that I depend on Hegel. However, 
although it is true that I have dealt with 
this author, I have never been Hegelian. 
6.    A third risk, related with the previous one, 
consisted in being misunderstood, that 
is, not that I would be mistaken, but that 
I might be the occasion of others not 
keeping in mind my disagreement with 
modern philosophy and thus falling into 
the error mentioned above. Luckily, so 
far, this has not come about. 
7.    A fourth danger, of no little import given 
that the risks mentioned above stem 
from it, consists in giving the impression 
of wanting to be an original thinker, or 
rather, of expounding upon a few 
peculiar notions. I must sincerely declare 
that such an intention is alien to me. The 
correctness of what I sustain depends on 
Kant y en Jaspers. Por consiguiente, me 
exponía a caer en equívocos o a ser mal 
interpretado, porque, a pesar de la 
coincidencia terminológica, mi modo de 
entender la libertad es distinto de las 
especulaciones modernas. Como 
anécdota, se puede comentar que 
algunas personas han sostenido que 
dependo de Hegel. Sin embargo, si bien 
es verdad que me he ocupado de ese 
autor, nunca he sido hegeliano. 
6.    Un tercer riesgo, concomitante con el 
anterior, consistía en ser mal entendido, 
es decir, no en equivocarme, sino en 
dar lugar a que otros no tuvieran en 
cuenta mi discordancia con la filosofía 
moderna, incurriendo así en el equívoco 
antes aludido. Por suerte, hasta el 
momento, ese acontecimiento no se ha 
dado. 
7.    Un cuarto peligro, y no de escasa 
importancia porque de él arrancan los 
riesgos antes apuntados, consistía en 
dar la impresión de pretender ser un 
pensador original, o bien, de exponer 
algunas ocurrencias particulares. He de 
declarar sinceramente que dicha 







the thematic richness and the validity of 
the methodology through which it is 
attained. I must insist on this point. To 
seek the truth entails attempting to 
advance in research. To the extent that 
one can, this must be done if one is a 
philosopher or scientist. Being original or 
not is a secondary question. Moreover, in 
these disciplines, it is not possible to 
propose novelties without finding a point 
of support in previous approaches, which 
merit commentary and continuation. 
Furthermore, I have always encouraged 
my disciples to not limit themselves to 
repeating me. 
8.    Specifically, my approach arises from the 
real distinction of being and essence 
formulated by Thomas Aquinas, which is 
the last significant discovery of 
traditional philosophy. In this sense, I do 
not consider myself a rebellious Thomist, 
as others have been, nor a commentator. 
It is noteworthy that in the 20th century, 
more than in other periods, attention has 
been directed to this aspect of Thomas 
Aquinas's thought. However, there are 
two issues that still have not been taken 
into account. First, that the real 
distinction of being and essence is not 
lo que sostengo depende de su riqueza 
temática y de la validez del método con 
que se alcanza. Insistiré en este punto. 
Buscar la verdad comporta tratar de 
avanzar en la investigación. En la 
medida en que uno puede, debe hacerlo 
si es filósofo o científico. Ser original o 
no es una cuestión secundaria. Por otra 
parte, en esas disciplinas no cabe 
proponer novedades sin encontrar un 
punto de apoyo en planteamientos 
anteriores, que merecen una glosa y 
una continuación. Por lo demás, 
siempre he recomendado a mis 
discípulos que no se reduzcan a 
repetirme. 
8.    En concreto, mi planteamiento arranca 
de la distinción real de ser y esencia 
formulada por Tomás de Aquino, que es 
la última averiguación importante de la 
filosofía tradicional. En este sentido, no 
me considero un tomista rebelde, como 
han sido otros, ni tampoco un 
comentarista. Es significativo que en el 
siglo XX se haya dirigido la atención, 
más que en otras épocas, a ese aspecto 
del pensamiento de Tomás de Aquino. 
Sin embargo, hay dos asuntos que 







entirely compatible with other notions 
that Thomas Aquinas, as synthesizing 
philosopher, gathers from the philosophy 
before him. This being so, a task of 
purification seems necessary which, to a 
large extent, I have carried out in other 
publications and to which I will later 
return in this book. Second, the 
aforementioned Thomistic discovery can 
be expanded, or made better use of, if it 
is studied in recto in man, that is, if the 
act of human being, which is person, is 
really distinguished from the essence of 
man. Indeed, since man is a very special 
creature, and is sufficiently distinct from 
others, by investigating the sense that 
the real distinction in him is attained one 
avoids treating it in general terms. By 
generalizing it, the real distinction losses 
its explanatory value of created reality. 
9.    In summary, the meaning of my proposal 
is clear: to capitalize on the central thesis 
of Thomism. In this way, it is not a 
question of retreating back to the 13th 
century, but rather of making it possible 
to confront what modern philosophy has 
tried to bring to light and to understand 
it in the right way, that is, to proceed 
with the expansion of the 
primer lugar, que la distinción real de 
ser y esencia no es enteramente 
compatible con otras nociones que 
Tomás de Aquino, como filósofo 
sintetizador, recoge de la filosofía 
anterior a él. De ser así, parece nece-
saria una tarea de depuración que, en 
gran medida, he llevado a cabo en otras 
publicaciones y sobre la que volveré en 
este libro. En segundo lugar, la aludida 
averiguación tomista puede ampliarse, 
o aprovecharse mejor, si se estudia in 
recto en el hombre, esto es, si se 
distingue realmente el acto de ser 
humano, que es persona, de la esencia 
del hombre. En efecto, como el hombre 
es una criatura muy especial, 
suficientemente distinta de otras, al 
investigar el sentido que en él alcanza 
la distinción real se evita tratarla en 
términos generales. Al generalizarla, la 
distinción real pierde su valor 
explicativo de la realidad creada. 
9.    En suma, el sentido de mi propuesta es 
claro: se trata de sacar partido a la tesis 
nuclear del tomismo. Con esto no se 
retrocede al siglo XIII, sino que es 
posible enfrentarse con lo que la 







transcendentals without diminishing 
metaphysics. 
10. Traditional philosophy lends itself to be 
continued. This means that it is an open 
philosophy or that it knows that it has not 
thought everything. In contrast, modern 
philosophy refuses to be continued, 
precisely because it is systematic and, 
therefore, closed. The great modern 
philosophers confuse philosophy with 
absolute knowledge. Interestingly, 
however, for some, classical philosophy 
is a finished philosophy. If Thomas 
Aquinas has thought everything that can 
be thought, then later philosophers can 
only repeat him. But this falls into the 
same error that systematic philosophy 
invites, but perhaps for other reasons, 
such as the criterion of authority or a 
certain mental laziness. I often speak of 
the historical situation, which is 
something like the emplacement in which 
one finds oneself and from which one can 
orientate oneself with respect to the 
philosophical discoveries that have been 
achieved up until the present day, 
starting with the conviction that 
philosophy is never finished. Far from 
being moved by the fancy for originality, 
la luz, entendiéndolo en términos 
correctos, es decir, sin deprimir la 
metafísica al proceder a la ampliación 
de los trascendentales. 
  
10. La filosofía tradicional se presta a ser 
continuada. Esto quiere decir que es 
una filosofía abierta o que sabe que no 
lo ha pensado todo. En cambio, la 
filosofía moderna se resiste a ser 
continuada, precisamente porque es 
sistemática y, por tanto, cerrada. Los 
grandes filósofos modernos confunden 
la filosofía con el saber absoluto. 
Curiosamente, sin embargo, para 
algunos la filosofía clásica es una 
filosofía terminada. Si Tomás de Aquino 
ha pensado todo lo que se puede 
pensar, los filósofos posteriores sólo 
pueden repetirlo. Pero eso es caer en el 
mismo error al que invitan los filósofos 
sistemáticos, aunque quizá por otros 
motivos, como puede ser el criterio de 
autoridad o cierta pereza mental. Suelo 
hablar de altura histórica, que es algo 
así como el emplazamiento en que uno 
se encuentra y desde el cual se orienta 







it is a question of doing philosophy while 
taking into account our historical 
position. The way to advance is also 
indicated by the historical moment, and 
lies primarily in insisting upon 
anthropology, because human being has 
not been studied sufficiently. According 
to my proposal, it is appropriate to call 
human being co-being or co-existence. 
11. Human co-existence as a theme capable 
of being attained does not appear in the 
philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. This is 
not due to some distraction on the part 
of this great metaphysician and Christian 
theologian; nor is it a mere omission that 
can be remedied by simply adding a new 
chapter to his work, because the reason 
for this omission is much deeper: that is, 
the impulse that nourishes Thomistic 
philosophy does not reach the theme; 
what I mean is that it falls short, or 
better, that it is hampered by its 
Aristotelian heritage and by the influence 
of Averroes. For this reason, it must be 
said that human co-existence is only 
virtually contained within Thomism, 
which therefore must be continued in 
accordance to some kind of 
reorganization. In order to study co-
logrados hasta hoy, a partir del 
convencimiento de que la filosofía 
nunca está terminada. Más que ser 
llevado por el prurito de originalidad, se 
trata de filosofar teniendo en cuenta la 
altura histórica. La vía de avance está 
indicada también por la coyuntura, y 
estriba sobre todo en insistir en la 
antropología, porque el ser humano no 
ha sido suficientemente estudiado. 
Según mi propuesta, conviene llamar al 
ser humano co-ser o co-existencia. 
11. La co-existencia humana como tema 
susceptible de ser alcanzado, no 
aparece en la filosofía de Tomás de 
Aquino. Ello no obedece a una dis-
tracción de este gran metafísico y 
teólogo cristiano; no es tampoco una 
mera omisión que pueda subsanarse 
con sólo añadir un capítulo nuevo a su 
obra, porque la razón de esa omisión es 
más profunda: se trata de que el 
impulso que alimenta la filosofía tomista 
no llega al tema; quiero decir que se 
queda corto, o mejor, que está frenado 
por la herencia aristotélica y el influjo 
de Averroes. Por eso se ha de decir que 
la co-existencia humana sólo 







existence, it is not enough to 
superimpose it on top of the themes that 
Thomas Aquinas dealt with because it is 
not aligned with them. 
12. Thomism in its totality cannot be 
regarded as something separated from 
some concrete historical situation with 
which we today have nothing important 
in common. That would be historicism 
and a misunderstanding of the value of 
tradition in Christian philosophy. 
Thomism is not a philosophy that can be 
superseded, but rather one that can be 
continued and one which, in 
anthropology, does not contain 
superficial confusions, but rather valid 
theses that are open to deeper and 
continued research, that is, truths that 
are not exhausted and are thus open to 
revision. The exhaustion of historical 
Thomism lies, concretely, in that the 
understanding of being is weakened by 
the mental limit. Thomism is a synthesis 
of Christian philosophy in which the 
mental limit has not yet been detected 
and in which, therefore, the impulse 
toward transcendental anthropology has 
been hindered. 
tomismo, que por ello se ha de con-
tinuar de acuerdo con cierta 
reorganización. Para investigar la co-
existencia, no basta con superponerla a 
los temas de que se ocupa Tomás de 
Aquino, porque no es alineable con 
ellos. 
12. No cabe considerar el tomismo en su 
totalidad como un segregado de una 
cierta situación histórica concreta, con 
la cual no tenemos hoy nada medular 
común. Esto sería historicismo, y una 
incomprensión del valor de la tradición 
en la filosofía cristiana. El tomismo no 
es una filosofía superable, sino 
continuable, que en antropología no 
contiene confusiones superficiales, sino 
tesis válidas susceptibles de 
profundización, de insistencia, es decir, 
verdades no agotadas y así abiertas a 
una revisión. El agotamiento del 
tomismo histórico se cifra, 
concretamente, en que la comprensión 
del ser está debilitada por el límite 
mental. El tomismo es una síntesis de 
filosofía cristiana en que el límite mental 







13. Thomistic philosophy is still focuses on 
the study of man as substance and 
nature. Although Thomas Aquinas goes 
beyond the Greek perspective in 
metaphysics, he does not extend his 
discoveries to human being. For this 
reason he sees the passage from the 
natural to the supernatural as a shift of 
attention. The substance as the 
foundation of natural operations is not 
unified with the consideration of man as 
elevated creature.  
14. On the other hand, modern philosophy 
can be surpassable. Here I understand 
surpassing as giving an account for the 
senseless identification of the human 
subject with the objectivity of thought. 
Understanding identity as a nexus of 
subject and object involves, on the one 
hand, that the object is constructed and, 
on the other, that the subject recognizes 
herself in it, that is, that she recovers 
herself in the mode of coming to be once 
again as object. This version of identity 
can only be explained if the exigency of 
self is raised to an absolute postulate . 
15. Transcending idealism means opposing 
the distortion of freedom that the 
por tanto, está frenado el impulso hacia 
la antropología trascendental. 
13. La filosofía tomista se centra todavía en 
el estudio del hombre como sustancia y 
naturaleza. Aunque Tomás de Aquino 
desborda la perspectiva griega en 
metafísica, no extiende sus hallazgos al 
ser humano. Por eso entiende el paso 
de lo natural a lo sobrenatural según un 
cambio de la atención. La sustancia 
como fundamento de las operaciones 
naturales no está unificada con la 
consideración del hombre como criatura 
elevada. 
14. En cambio, la filosofía moderna sí es 
superable. Aquí entiendo por 
superación dar razón de una inane 
identificación del sujeto humano con la 
objetividad pensada. Entender la 
identidad como nexo del sujeto con el 
objeto comporta, por un lado, que el 
objeto es construido y, por otro, que el 
sujeto se reconoce en él, esto es, que 
se recobra en el modo de volver a tener 
lugar como objeto. Esta versión de la 
identidad sólo se explica si la pretensión 








exigency of self entails. To the extent 
that the exigency of self advances, 
freedom becomes ever more submerged 
into thought. The imprisonment of 
freedom in the construction of the 
identity of the subject with the object is 
a philosophical deviation that occurs at 
the expense of freedom. Therefore, to 
surpass modern philosophy is to rescue 
freedom. Similarly, the proposed 
continuation of Thomism (which ignores 
the transcendental extent of freedom) 
cannot ignore the critique of modern 
philosophy. Having laid out the question 
in this way, the follow questions are 
posed: What is the objective value of the 
intuition of the subject? Although, in 
principle, the object is not in itself taken 
as the subject, is the intuition of the 
subject objective? Is there any objective 
correspondence to the subject? The 
answer must be negative: idealism does 
not achieve its purpose. The object is 
simply, and nothing more than, the 
mental limit. 
16. Idealism marks the loss of the 
transcendental value of the human 
person for the very reason that it 
constitutes itself as exigency of self. The 
15. La superación del idealismo significa 
una oposición a la desvirtuación de la 
libertad que la pretensión de sí conlleva. 
A medida que la pretensión de sí 
avanza, la libertad va siendo sumergida 
en el pensamiento. El aprisionamiento 
de la libertad en la construcción de la 
identidad del sujeto con el objeto es 
una desviación filosófica que tiene lugar 
a expensas de la libertad. Por eso, 
superar la filosofía moderna es rescatar 
la libertad. Paralelamente, la propuesta 
continuación del tomismo –que ignora 
el alcance trascendental de la libertad– 
no puede desentenderse de la crítica a 
la filosofía moderna. Formulada así la 
cuestión, se plantean las siguientes 
preguntas: ¿cuál es el valor objetivo de 
la intuición del sujeto? Aunque, en 
principio, el objeto no se vea de suyo 
como sujeto, ¿la intuición del sujeto es 
objetiva? ¿Se da alguna 
correspondencia objetiva del sujeto? La 
respuesta ha de ser negativa: el 
idealismo no logra su propósito. El 
objeto es simplemente, y nada más, el 
límite mental. 
16. El idealismo marca la pérdida del valor 







binomial subject-object is the negating of 
human co-existence in thought, not the 
authentic openness of transcendental 
anthropology. The centering of attention 
on having [haber] in order to interpret it 
as identical to the person is arbitrary  . 
Idealism is not simply a thematic error, 
but rather a deterioration of human co-
existence as freedom. 
17. But precisely therein lies the usefulness 
of idealism for the detection 
[detectacion] of the mental limit and its 
abandonment in anthropology. This 
usefulness remains untapped in the fear-
filled rejection of the idealist approach 
because of fear of losing reality - or faith. 
Taking advantage of this requires putting 
aside the fear of getting ensnared in the 
intuition of the self when studying it. 
Idealism lays out on the table, in the way 
just mentioned, the question of the 
mental limit, whose detection is 
indispensable for the continuation of 
traditional philosophy. I insist, the 
detection of the mental limit is not 
independent from the task of overcoming 
idealism. 
por lo mismo que se constituye como 
pretensión de sí. El binomio sujeto-
objeto es el anegamiento de la co-
existencia humana en el pensamiento, 
no la auténtica apertura de la 
antropología trascendental. Centrar la 
atención en el haber para interpretarlo 
como idéntico a la persona es una 
arbitrariedad. El idealismo no es 
simplemente un error temático, sino 
una decaída de la co-existencia humana 
como libertad. 
17. Pero precisamente en ello reside la 
utilidad del idealismo para la 
detectación del límite mental y su 
abandono en antropología. Tal utilidad 
permanece sin aprovechar en el 
horrorizado rechazo del planteamiento 
idealista por temor a perder la realidad 
–o la fe–. Dicho aprovechamiento exige 
desechar el temor a quedar prendido en 
la intuición de sí mismo al estudiarla. El 
idealismo pone sobre el tapete, de 
señalada manera, la cuestión del límite 
mental, cuya detectación es 
imprescindible para la continuación de 
la filosofía tradicional. Insisto, la 







18. The detection of the mental limit has a 
methodological value. One of the 
dimension of this method is the character 
of additionally [ademas]: the person is 
not in the object. 
19. The character of additionally is the 
method required for attaining human co-
existence; naturalist anthropology is 
incapable of this. In turn, post-christian 
anthropocentric philosophy disrupts and 
misdirects anthropological research. 
Attaining human co¬existence requires 
giving up the exigency of thinking it, that 
is, of finding it in the object or as an 
object. 
20. Furthermore, the exigency to intuit the 
subject in the object entails the 
elimination of the intentional value of the 
latter. This is unavoidable because, by 
interpreting it as identical with the 
subject, the object is absolutized as itself 
and is deprived of its intentional value, 
reduced to the representation in which 
the subject recognizes itself. 
Intentionality is a certain openness, a 
clarity obtained by the cognitive 
operations, which does not illuminate the 
subject, but rather the forms of extra-
independiente de la tarea de superar el 
idealismo. 
18. La detectación del límite mental posee 
valor metódico. Una de las dimensiones 
de ese método es el carácter de 
además: en el objeto no está la 
persona. El carácter de además es el 
método requerido para alcanzar la co-
existencia humana; la antropología 
naturalista es incapaz de ello. A su vez, 
la filosofía antropocéntrica postcristiana 
desbarata y descamina la investigación 
antropológica. Alcanzar la co-existencia 
humana exige la renuncia a la 
pretensión de pensarla, es decir, de 
encontrarla en el objeto o como objeto. 
19. Por otra parte, la pretensión de intuir el 
sujeto en el objeto comporta la 
eliminación del valor intencional de este 
ultimo. Ello es inevitable, por cuanto, al 
interpretarlo como idéntico al sujeto, el 
objeto se absolutiza como sí mismo y es 
privado de su valor intencional, 
reduciéndose a la representación en la 
que el sujeto se reconoce. La 
intencionalidad es una cierta apertura, 
una claridad obtenida por las 







mental reality. In short, the appearance 
of the subject in thought is a loss both 
for the person's character of additionally 
as well as for objective intentionality . 
21. In this way the motives that were present 
when I first started doing philosophy and 
which matured though many years are 
made clear. I must now mention the 
method in accordance with which the 
corrections mentioned have been made 
and by which new themes have been 
accessed. I call this method the 
abandonment of the mental limit. So as 
to avoid repetition, I will now mention 
the book in which this method is 
presented and the plan set out for the 
development of its thematic as well as 
the twists and turns that this plan has 
suffered. 
22. Access to Being (a book published in 
1964) described the mental limit and 
presented the four major theme that are 
made accessible by abandoning it. Four 
books were to cover these themes. 
Being, volume I, published in 1965 (2nd 
ed. 1997), deals with the first principles, 
that is, with extra-mental existence. In it, 
I argue that the first principles are three, 
ilumina al sujeto, sino a las formas de la 
realidad extramental. En suma, la 
aparición del sujeto en el pensamiento 
es la pérdida tanto del carácter de 
además de la persona como de la 
intencionalidad objetiva. 
20. De esta manera quedan expuestos los 
motivos actuantes desde que empecé a 
filosofar y que han ido madurando a lo 
largo de muchos años. He de aludir 
ahora al método de acuerdo con el cual 
las rectificaciones señaladas se han 
llevado a cabo y se ha accedido a una 
nueva temática. Denomino a ese 
método abandono del límite mental. 
Para no incurrir en repeticiones, citaré a 
continuación el libro en que ese método 
se expone y el plan previsto para su 
desarrollo temático, así como los 
avatares que ese plan ha sufrido. 
21. En El acceso al ser –libro publicado en 
1964– se describe el límite mental y se 
anuncian los cuatro grandes temas que 
se hacen accesibles al abandonarlo. De 
esos temas deberían ocuparse cuatro 
libros. El ser, tomo I,publicado en 1965 
(2ª ed. 1997), trata de los primeros 







and that it is necessary to distinguish 
them. Metaphysics focuses on the 
principle of identity, the principle of non-
contradiction, and the principle of 
transcendental causality. Being, volume 
II, would have studied extra-mental 
essence, which is dependent principiality, 
that is the four predicamental causes 
insofar as con-causal. Being, volume III, 
would have dealt with the human 
person; and Being, volume IV, with the 
human essence. 
23. Volume II of Being was not published, 
but its content is contained in Volume IV 
of the Course on a Theory of Knowledge 
(1994-1996), which presents how the 
mental limit is abandoned in such a way 
so as to explicitate the predicamental 
causes. For the last two volumes of the 
original plan, I have chosen to tittle them 
Transcendental Anthropology, and their 
publication begins with this book . The 
first volume of Transcendental 
Anthropology is dedicated to the person, 
the act of human being. The second 
volume, to the human essence. The first 
volume is divided into three parts. The 
first is the approach; the second deals 
with the method; and the third part of 
extramental. En él sostengo que los 
primeros principios son tres y que es 
menester distinguirlos. La metafísica 
versa sobre el principio de identidad, el 
principio de no contradicción y el 
principio de causalidad trascendental. El 
ser, tomo II,habría de estudiar la 
esencia extramental, que es la 
principialidad dependiente, es decir, las 
cuatro causas predicamentales en tanto 
que concausales. El ser, tomo III, 
trataría de la persona humana; y El ser, 
tomo IV, de la esencia del hombre. 
22. El tomo II de El ser no se ha publicado, 
pero su contenido está recogido en el 
tomo IV del Curso de teoría del 
conocimiento (1994-1996), donde se 
expone de qué manera se abandona el 
límite mental para explicitar las causas 
predicamentales. A los dos últimos 
tomos del plan original he preferido 
titularlos Antropología trascendental, y 
su publicación se inicia con el presente 
libro. El primer tomo de la Antropología 
trascendental está dedicado a la 
persona, al acto de ser humano. El 
segundo tomo, a la esencia del hombre. 
El primer tomo está dividido en tres 







the subject matter itself, that is, of the 
personal transcendentals. It is, 
nevertheless, necessary to mention 
these last in earlier parts. 
24. These changes of titles are explained by 
the following reasons. After a some of 
expository essays , it was realized that 
the knowledge of con-causality 
corresponds above all to judgment. This 
made the study of human knowing 
necessary, since judgment is preceded 
by abstraction. It was therefore 
necessary to proceed with the study of 
the first intellectual operation and of the 
habits and operations that follow it in 
order to determine the mode of 
abandoning the mental limit when 
continuing the activity of the intelligence; 
this amounted to writing a course on the 
theory of human knowledge. Thus, it is 
clear why the second dimension of the 
abandonment of the mental limit was 
presented much later than expected. 
25. In turn, volumes III and IV of Being were 
written between 1970 and 1972. I 
decided not to publish them because I 
soon realized that the draft was 
excessively schematic and contained 
la segunda versa sobre el método; y la 
tercera parte sobre lo propiamente 
temático, es decir, sobre los 
trascendentales personales. Sin 
embargo, es obligado aludir a estos 
últimos en las partes anteriores. 
23. Estos cambios de titulación se explican 
por las siguientes razones. Después de 
algunos ensayos expositivos, se vio que 
el conocimiento de la concausalidad 
corresponde sobre todo al juicio. Ello 
obligaba a estudiar el conocimiento 
humano, pues el juicio es precedido por 
la abstracción. Era preciso, por tanto, 
proceder al estudio de la primera 
operación intelectual y de los hábitos y 
operaciones que la siguen, para 
averiguar el modo de abandonar el 
límite mental al proseguir la actividad 
de la inteligencia; lo que equivalía a 
escribir un curso de teoría del 
conocimiento humano. Así se entiende 
porqué la segunda dimensión del 
abandono del límite mental ha sido 
expuesta mucho más tarde de lo 
previsto. 
24. A su vez, los tomos III y IV de El ser 







gaps. For that reason, I spent a 
considerable amount of time to 
deepening and completing this draft, 
especially through doctoral courses 
taught since that time at the University 
of Navarre and in some American 
universities. It became clear that in order 
to attain the human person, by following 
the abandonment of the mental limit, a 
new formulation of the theory of the 
transcendentals was necessary. Thus the 
title of this book. 
26. I must admit that among the formal 
defects of the present text, due largely to 
the plurality of its immediate sources, the 
excess of self-citations stands out. As 
much as such a procedure is unadvisable 
because it affects the clarity of the 
presentation, it has not been possible to 
do away with it, since the thematic of the 
third dimension of the abandonment of 
the mental limit is closely related to those 
that are accessible by following the other 
dimensions of this method, which have 
already been extensively covered in 
other places and are impossible to 
reproduce in full. 
No me decidí a publicarlos porque 
pronto comprobé que dicha redacción 
era excesivamente esquemática y 
ofrecía lagunas. Por eso, he dedicado 
bastante tiempo a profundizar y 
completar dicha redacción, sobre todo, 
a través de los cursos de doctorado 
dictados desde entonces en la 
Universidad de Navarra y en algunas 
universidades americanas. Se ha hecho 
patente que para alcanzar la persona 
humana, siguiendo el abandono del 
límite mental, es necesaria una nueva 
formulación de la teoría de los 
trascendentales. De aquí el título de 
este libro. 
25. Debo reconocer que entre los defectos 
formales del presente texto, debidos en 
buena parte a la pluralidad de sus 
fuentes inmediatas, destaca el exceso 
de autocitas. Por más que se trate de 
un procedimiento desaconsejable por 
afectar a la limpidez de la exposición, 
no ha sido posible prescindir de él, pues 
la temática de la tercera dimensión del 
abandono del límite mental guarda 
estrecha relación con las que son 
accesibles siguiendo otras dimensiones 







27. Moreover, since the third dimension of 
the abandonment of the mental limit 
attains the highest themes, the internal 
citations are not mere repetitions 
because the themes accessible through 
the other dimensions of the proposed 
method acquire a greater precision upon 
attaining human co-existence. This will 
be especially noticeable in the exposition 
of the innate habits, which in the Course 
on a Theory of Knowledge is treated very 
briefly. It is also desirable to distinguish 
with sufficient clarity the first principles, 
studied in volume I of Being, from the 
human person. 
28. Without the assistance of Salvador Pia 
Tarazona in the drafting of the text and 
without the help of Ma. Jose Franquet, 
who transcribed its immediate 
antecedents, the publication of this book 
would have been long postponed. I must 
extend my gratitude to professors 
Ignacio Falgueras and Jorge Mario 
Posada, with whom I have had long 
conversations in which perspectives of 
great interest have arisen. To my 
colleagues and friends Ricardo Yepes, 
whose premature death I lament, and 
Angel Luis Gonzalez, chairman of this 
extensamente en otros lugares y que es 
imposible reproducir por entero. 
26. Por otra parte, como la tercera 
dimensión del abandono del límite 
mental alcanza los temas más altos, las 
citas internas no son meras 
repeticiones, porque los temas 
accesibles con las otras dimensiones del 
método propuesto adquieren una 
mayor precisión al alcanzar la co-
existencia humana. Ello se notará 
especialmente en la exposición de los 
hábitos innatos, que en el Curso de 
teoría del conocimiento se tratan de una 
manera muy escueta. También es 
conveniente distinguir con suficiente 
nitidez los primeros principios, 
estudiados en el tomo I de El ser, de la 
persona humana. 
27. Sin la colaboración de Salvador Piá 
Tarazona en la redacción del texto y sin 
la ayuda de Mª José Franquet, que ha 
transcrito sus antecedentes inmediatos, 
la publicación de este libro se habría 
retrasado mucho. He de extender mi 
agradecimiento a los profesores Ignacio 
Falgueras y Jorge Mario Posada, con los 







Department, I am indebted to their 
attentive and enthusiastic support, and 
to the encouragement that they have 
always given me in the publication of my 
works. 
conversaciones en las que han surgido 
perspectivas de sumo interés. A mis 
colegas y amigos Ricardo Yepes, cuya 
prematura muerte tanto deploro, y 
Ángel Luis González, Decano de esta 
Facultad, debo el solícito y entusiasta 
apoyo, el impulso que siempre me han 
prestado en la pu 
 
